Assurance and Evidence

This page tells a skeptical reader how to check IntentSutra instead of trusting it. It is written from the standpoint of an independent auditor.

What was independently produced

ArtifactWhereWhat it shows
Raw TAP logtest-results/test-run.tapevery test name and result: 116 passed, 0 failed, 2 skipped
Fuzz resultstest-results/fuzz-results.json5398 generated inputs; 398 audit-log edits all detected
CLI transcriptssamples/cli-*.txta real lifecycle, including refused actions and exit codes
Sample audit, honestsamples/audit/audit-report.htmlverdict PASS, 11 checks
Sample audit, forgedsamples/audit-forged/audit-report.htmlthe same workspace after a silent edit: verdict FAIL
Digeststest-results/SHA256SUMS.txtSHA-256 of each proof file

The forged sample is the important one: an audit that never fails proves nothing. Here the audit demonstrably fails when state is edited without a matching audit event.

Verify it yourself in five minutes

git clone https://github.com/shahvatsalofficial/intentsutra-ai && cd intentsutra-ai
npm test                    # unit, integration, security, CLI tests
npm run proof               # regenerates every proof file from scratch
node packages/cli/index.mjs verify --report docs/proof/audit-sample/audit-report.json

Then open docs/proof/audit-sample-forged/audit-report.html and read finding AUD-08.

What a reviewer should challenge

  1. Does the audit trust the registry? No. It recomputes content hashes, evidence hashes and the attested state from raw data, then cross-checks counts against the audit log.
  2. Could audit be gamed by deleting the log? An empty log with a non-empty registry fails AUD-08. Truncating the newest events is not detectable locally; keep the folder in Git.
  3. Is the seal a signature? No. It detects modification of a report; anyone can regenerate a new report with a new seal.
  4. Are imported test results trustworthy? Not by themselves. They are labelled so in every report, and AUD-06 fails if a label is upgraded.

Not covered (honest list)

Native execution inside any IDE · signatures and key management · multi-process concurrency · legal or regulatory conformance · accessibility conformance testing with assistive technology · behavior on macOS and Linux outside hosted CI · performance at large scale.

Severity policy

critical and high failures produce verdict FAIL and exit code 2 with --strict. medium and low give PASS-WITH-FINDINGS. Informational checks never fail.